PBS Reports "A Dangerous Business"
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/workplace/
Read about its philosophy, its record, and the people killed in its
plants. Plus, examine company and government documents -- and more of
McWane's response to FRONTLINE, The New York Times and the CBC's
reporting.
The McWane corporation's aggressive management style -- what it calls
"disciplined management practices" -- has helped the company to
achieve tremendous profits through increasing worker productivity. Some
critics argue, however, that McWane's gains have come at a very high cost:
its workers' safety -- and in some cases their lives. But McWane's way of
doing business is not the only way, as a comparison with its longtime
Birmingham competitor, the American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (ACIPCO), clearly
suggests. Here's a look at the two companies, both founded and based in
Birmingham, Ala., and their competing visions.
Here are profiles of seven employees who were injured or killed at McWane
plants. With foundries stretching across 10 U.S. states and Canada, over
the past seven years McWane Inc. has amassed more safety violations than
all of its major competitors combined. More than 4,600 of its workers have
been hurt on the job since 1995, and nine have been killed.
On Jan. 3, 2003, the director of OSHA's enforcement program sent McWane
this letter in response to McWane's proposal to partner with OSHA to
improve its worker safety program. He writes, "Most employers OSHA
partners with have demonstrated a strong prior commitment towards worker
health and safety; your history with the Agency does not yet demonstrate
this level of commitment. More specifically, given the relatively recent
history at the Tyler Pipe facility, we cannot at this time conclude that
such is evident throughout McWane facilities."
In 1995, McWane subsidiary Ransom Industries bought Tyler Pipe Co. in
Tyler, Texas. Federal officials say that since its purchase by McWane,
Tyler Pipe has stood out as a repetitive violator of safety rules. In this
report, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, federal inspectors
from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), detail
conditions at the plant, including scarred and disfigured workers, puddles
of molten metal on the floor, and poorly lit work areas.
In this confidential 1996 memo to the New York State attorney general's
office, McWane's attorneys state that the company would not accept any
criminal responsibility for the 1995 death of an employee at its Kennedy
Valve plant in Elmira, N.Y. Playing political hardball, they warn that
criminal charges "could result in the closure of Kennedy Valve that
would cost the Elmira area more than 320 jobs."
>
McWane's Response
Although McWane would not agree to a face-to-face interview for this story, the
company sent a number of e-mails and letters during the course of FRONTLINE, The
New York Times, and the CBC's reporting. Here is an extended excerpt from a
letter sent by McWane Inc. President G. Ruffner Page on Oct. 17, 2002, that
articulates the company's defense of its corporate safety and environmental
policies.
>
The New York Times: Dangerous Business
Read their three-part series entitled "Dangerous Business." The
Web site also includes an extended multimedia feature with an interactive
graphic on how cast-iron pipe is made; charts that detail McWane's safety
record in comparison to its major competitors; and "behind the
scenes" audio from reporters Lowell Bergman and David Barstow. [FREE
New York Times Registration Required]
>
CBC News: A Toxic Company
Through takeovers and mergers since 1989, McWane has won control of the
lion's share of the Canadian market for cast-iron pipes and related
products. On the CBC's Web site, read more about McWane's presence in
Canada -- including documents related to the company's 1995 guilty plea
for conspiring to unduly lessen competition in the supply and sale of
ductile iron pipe -- and more of the company's response to the joint
reporting of FRONTLINE, The New York Times, and the CBC.
Over the past 20 years, the prevailing wisdom in Washington has been that
regulation strangles business. Under heavy lobbying by industry, the power of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been challenged,
making it easier for some companies to dismiss the agency's efforts to enforce
workplace safety laws. "The fact is they consider OSHA a mosquito,"
former OSHA administrator Charles Jeffress tells FRONTLINE. "They'd rather
pay the fines than bring their plants into compliance." Here's a closer
look at OSHA and the politics of workplace safety, including interviews with
Jeffress and OSHA's current administrator, John Henshaw, and a Web-exclusive
analysis by Prof. David Weil of Boston University and Harvard's Kennedy School
of Government.
John Henshaw has been assistant secretary of labor for occupational
health and safety since August 2001. In this interview, he maintains
that OSHA regulations are strong and points for evidence to the
"significant" reduction of workplace injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities over the past 30 years. He also says that he believes OSHA
enforcement actions should be targeted at "bad actors" --
those companies with the highest injury rates and worst violation
records. This is an edited transcript of his interview with FRONTLINE,
conducted on Sept. 30, 2002.
Charles Jeffress served as assistant secretary of labor for occupational
safety and health during the late 1990s. In this interview, Jeffress
argues that federal workplace safety laws are weak, pointing out that
"to willfully violate the law and kill someone is a misdemeanor
under the OSHA Act." He also explains how the theory behind the
1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act was to be preventive and assess
penalties for existing hazards. However, he warns that in practice the
OSHA law "has inadequate teeth" for the federal government to
rein in a rogue company. This is an edited transcript of his interview
with FRONTLINE, conducted on Sept. 30, 2002.
OSHA has long been at the center of ideological battles over the power
and reach of the federal government. In this Web-exclusive essay for
FRONTLINE, Prof. David Weil of Boston University and Harvard's Kennedy
School of Government looks at the political context in which OSHA has
historically operated and the political realities it now faces. He then
offers his analysis of where OSHA has been most (and least) effective in
the past and what it will take to make OSHA more effective -- and our
workplaces safer -- in the future.
Since the creation of OSHA 32 years ago, there have been more than
200,000 workplace-related deaths. However, OSHA has referred only 151
cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. Federal
prosecutors have declined to pursue two-thirds of these cases, and only
eight of them have resulted in prison sentences for company officials.
Here's a look at those eight cases.
So what does all this news get?
Since the Frontline report on the McWane corporation first aired, there have
been several significant developments:
The Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency launched a
criminal investigation of McWane plants in January 2003 -- the same month The
New York Times and FRONTLINE reported on McWane in a series of newspaper
articles and in the documentary "A Dangerous Business."
Current and former McWane employees tell The New York Times that
they have been contacted by criminal investigators from the Justice
Department and the EPA. Law enforcement officials also described the probe,
with one senior investigator saying the investigation is "very
significant, substantial and nationwide." McWane President G. Ruffner
Page told the Times that no state or federal investigators had
contacted the company. "If we are contacted, however, we will give them
our full cooperation, as is our policy and practice," he maintained in
a statement. "Furthermore, we are confident that any such investigation
would reveal the significant progress we have made in recent years on
safety, health and environmental compliance." A Justice Department
spokesman, when asked by the Times, refused to confirm or deny the
existence of an investigation.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) continues to
conduct special inspections of five McWane foundries. In April 2003, the
agency fined the company $196,000 for 13 serious violations, four repeat
violations and one minor infraction that it found in an October 2002
inspection of Tyler Pipe following Guadalupe
Garcia's accident.
In March 2003, OSHA announced a new "enhanced enforcement
policy" on workplace safety, designed to strengthen its ability to act
against companies who receive "high gravity" citations. OSHA
administrator John Henshaw told The New York Times that the changes
in OSHA policy were prompted by the Times and FRONTLINE's joint
investigation of McWane. Intended to strengthen existing regulations, the
policy changes include on-site follow-up inspections of all workplaces that
receive a "high gravity" citation and programmed inspections that
record the "overall corporate entity" that owns an individual
workplace. OSHA also said that it would implement provisions in settlement
agreements requiring companies to: hire consultants to examine the safety
procedures in the affected building; apply the agreement throughout the
company; and report all serious injuries and illnesses requiring outside
medical treatment to OSHA.
McWane says it is devoting more resources to efforts to improve worker
safety and upgrade environmental protection equipment. In April 2003, McWane
and the United Steelworkers of America announced an agreement to work
together to improve workplace safety at McWane plants. In a joint statement,
the company and the union said they would improve the "skills,
functions and authority of our joint safety and health committees" and
encourage "all employees to report workplace hazards, suggest how to
correct them and to report all occupational injuries, illnesses, accidents
and near misses." The two sides agreed to "eliminate any
impediments" to reporting such instances. Workers interviewed by The
New York Times say that they have seen an improvement in working
conditions since January and that managers are beginning to place compliance
with safety and environmental regulations above production concerns.